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If Britain were to leave the EU, yet seek somehow to remain a part of the Single Market, the EFTA
countries would watch with interest. This is, after all, the deal Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
and Switzerland currently have. In this post, Sebastian Remøy responds to the proceedings
of The LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe.
Britain as an EEA-EFTA State?
In terms of political legitimacy, the EU demands quite a high price for the EEA agreement. Since
1994, the EEA-EFTA States (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) have adopted nearly 11000
legal acts that essentially extend the effect of EU Internal Market legislation and the Internal Market’s four freedoms
to their own markets. The rub is that these states have no representation or votes in the European Council or the
European Parliament when the rules are being decided, and with no Commissioners or officials from EFTA countries
in the European Commission, they also have very little influence in initiatives taken by the EU executive. Moreover,
the EEA-EFTA States, and in particular Norway, make financial contributions to the EU that are substantial and
comparable with those of EU Member States.[1]
Some view this as a form of taxation without representation, a sort of self-inflicted economic colonization. Others
say that because these EEA-EFTA states voluntarily accept this arrangement they have preserved more of their
sovereignty than EU member states. Yet it seems hardly likely that the UK would accept implementing over 400 EU
laws a year without any voting rights and political influence over their promulgation. With no ability to vote in
Brussels, the Norwegian Parliament rubber stamps on average 5 EU laws a day into Norwegian law. How would
something like that go down in Westminster?
Even if Britain could accept the current EEA arrangement, aka the Norway option, it may be too big to simply slide
into an arrangement that the EU for many years has only grudgingly accepted, and has tolerated because it was
only supposed to be temporary and now is too difficult to get rid of. Most EU officials are too polite to admit this about
the EEA. They praise it in public, even though it is an unspoken truth in Brussels that the agreement is the Plan B.
Plan A has always been EU membership.
Whether the EU would accept Britain as an EEA-EFTA state is one matter. But another equally important question is
whether the EFTA States would welcome back the UK as an EFTA member, and one that wants to participate in the
EEA Agreement as an EFTA State. All four EFTA States must agree on accepting a new member into EFTA, and
then all EU and all EFTA States that comprise the EEA (30 States excluding the UK) would unanimously have to
agree to the UK reentering the EEA as an EFTA State.
Norway is not a large country, but alongside Iceland and Liechtenstein on the EFTA pillar of the EEA, it is influential,
some might even say dominant. This dynamic would change significantly were the UK to become an EEA-EFTA
State. The UK would dwarf all the other EEA-EFTA States, and to some extent also Switzerland which is in EFTA but
not the EEA. Do the EFTA states relish the prospect of a giant like the UK lumbering in with its all its idiosyncrasies,
hang-ups and requests for opt-outs, sometimes even beyond what the EFTA States have secured?[2] British re-
entry into EFTA would certainly disrupt existing power structures within the organisation. For the time being, Norway
is not encouraging Britain to leave the EU and jump back into its old club, although neither has it indicated it would
try to stop British re-entry into EFTA.[3] EFTA States will unlikely express strong positions on this until there is more
clarity about the direction the UK will take – following the referendum on June 23rd.
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EEA-plus: a non-EU member state but a member of the
Internal Market with voting rights?
One can easily imagine that a “Brexited” UK might seek to
secure a more democratic arrangement than is available to the
EEA-EFTA States, so that it at least could vote on the Internal
Market acquis that it would have to adopt should it wish to
continue to participate in that market. Homogeneity is a
fundamental principle of the Internal Market and other EU and
EEA members will continue to insist upon the same rule book
and a level playing field for all market participants.
If it became possible for the UK to participate in the decision
making of Internal Market rules without being an EU member
state, then it might entice other countries to leave the EU and
seek the same. It may also induce the EFTA countries to try to
improve their arrangements with the EU. Why should they hold
onto a form of association that is less good than what another
non-member has cherry-picked?
Yet a sort of EEA-plus is advocated by some optimistic Brexit proponents, who maintain that Britain certainly can get
something better than the best association deal that already exists, namely the EEA Agreement. They argue that
Britain’s weight as an economic power will induce EU negotiators to be more accommodating than they have so far
been to the much smaller EFTA states. But it is also possible that that the UK’s size will count against granting the
UK something better than the EEA. Why establish an even greater exception to the practice of not encouraging
cherry picking than the one presented by the EEA Agreement?
But let’s suppose that Britain invokes Article 50, on the assumption that it will secure access to decision making over
the Internal Market acquis. What would the UK’s relationship be to the European Institutions: to both those in the EU
and EFTA? What role would British officials have in these institutions? Would a new UK pillar have to be established
that is better than the EFTA pillar of the EEA Agreement?[4] These are some important scenarios upon which the
EFTA countries are undoubtedly pondering.
Having a voice in Brussels from outside the EU
While advising many stakeholders on how to influence policies and decisions taken by the EU, I am in a somewhat
privileged position to compare the access to decision makers that organisations from EFTA and other 3rd countries
have, versus the access that interest groups from EU countries have.
It is important that UK interests understand what they are losing, if the UK leaves the EU.
Stakeholders from Norway, just like those from say Thailand, Ecuador or Ghana have no MEPs from their nations to
whom they can appeal when important EU legislation is being promulgated on a matter of vital interest to them.
Naturally, therefore, there are no Norwegians to chair committees in the Parliament, or to serve as rapporteurs or
shadow rapporteurs on important dossiers. There are no Norwegian ministers at Council meetings to take up their
causes. Nor are there Norwegian cabinet members working for Commissioners who can keep an eye out for their
interests. Indeed, there is no Norwegian Commissioner or Director General, and aside from a few national experts
here and there, there are practically no Norwegian officials drafting legislation or heading case teams in the
Commission services, and certainly not heading directorates or units there.
A Norwegian has never held the Presidency of the European Parliament, like Ireland has done. There will never be a
Norwegian Secretary-General or a President of the Commission, as there has just been a Portuguese one, or today
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there is one from Luxembourg. Norway has no chance to host any EU agencies, not even ones in which the country
has immense expertise, such as fisheries or energy. Norway does not have voting rights in these agencies or for that
matter in comitology committees that produce technical regulations. Norwegian diplomats who are renowned for
their skill in finding compromises and helping to resolve difficult conflicts around the world, are excluded from the
European External Action Service.
This lack of access to EU decision making is quite remarkable, considering that Norway adopts about 75% of EU
legislation. This denial of influence and self-absenting from the governance of an economic market of which it is an
integral part is quite extraordinary. Is the UK prepared to end up in a similar situation?
This post represents the views of the author and not those of the BrexitVote blog, nor the LSE. Image from the EFTA
website (public domain).
Sebastian Remøy leads the editorial team of the Alliance for Responsible Commerce. He is head of Public Affairs at
Kreab, and also runs the consultancy’s trade and competition practice. He worked in the EEA Coordination Unit of
the EFTA Secretariat from 2001 to 2006.
[1] Norway contributes over €800 million to the EU each year.
[2] Norway participates in the Schengen and Dublin Agreements, the Prüm Treaty, Eurojust, the European Arrest
Warrant. In total there are over 70 agreements that bind Norway to the EU. One way or another, Norway adopts
about 75% of EU legislation.
[3] “I have a hard time seeing the UK, with its global ambition, dedication and contributions, being comfortable with
such an arrangement. I say this not out of fear for a return of the UK to EFTA – although that would alter Norway’s
relative position within the EEA/EFTA. After all, we are the great power in the Oslo-Reykjavik-Vaduz axis.” Vidar
Helgesen, Europe Minister 16.10.13-16.12.15. Brexit: a Norwegian view, article in Open Democracy, 19. mars 2015.
[4] The EEA Agreement has two pillars, an EFTA pillar and an EU pillar. The EFTA pillar very roughly mirrors EU
institutions containing organisations such as the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court which ensure
Internal Market compliance by EEA EFTA States. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein meet in a Standing Committee
to agree positions jointly, before taking joint decisions in the EEA Council with the EU (Council/Presidency/EEAS).
There is an EEA Parliamentary Committee and a EEA Consultative Committee, both with advisory roles only.
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